CSLI, 2012 Paper: 978-1-57586-524-9 | Cloth: 978-1-57586-523-2 | eISBN: 978-1-57586-549-2 Library of Congress Classification B105.M4P475 2012 Dewey Decimal Classification 121.68
ABOUT THIS BOOK | AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY | TOC
ABOUT THIS BOOK
In this volume John Perry develops his “reflexive-referential” account of indexicals, demonstratives, and proper names. For this new second edition, Perry has added a new preface and two chapters on the distinction between semantics and pragmatics and on attitude reports. He reveals a coherent and structured family of contents—from reflexive contents that place conditions on their actual utterance to fully incremental contents that place conditions only on the objects of reference—reconciling the legitimate insights of both the referentialist and descriptivist traditions.
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
John Perry is the Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Stanford University.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface to the Second Edition
Preface to the First Edition
1. Two Problems About Reference 1.1 Mach and the shabby pedagogue
1.2 Paradigms, arguments and problems
1.3 Has semantics rested on a mistake?
1.4 The reflexive-referential theory
1.5 Network content
1.6 Plan
Part I. Reflexivity and the Co-reference Problem
2. Contents and Propositions 2.1 Introduction
2.2 Meaning and content
2.3 Common sense and official content
2.4 The classificatory concept of content
2.5 Conditions and propositions
2.6 Varieties of designation 3. Utterance and Context 3.1 Introduction
3.2 The reflexive-referential theory
3.3 Signs, tokens and utterances
3.4 Context
3.5 Semantic uses of context
3.6 Content-supplemental uses of context 4. Context and Cognitive Paths 4.1 Introduction
4.2 Information games
4.3 Cognitive paths
4.4 Indexicals and contexts
4.5 Stretch the dog
4.6 Dthat
4.7 Real, doxastic and fictional contexts 5. Meanings and Contents 5.1 Introduction
5.2 Reichenbach, reflexivity and indexical content
5.3 Indexical content and referential content
5.4 Varieties of content
5.5 Official content
5.6 Stretching cognitive content
5.7 Austin's two tubes 6. Names and the Co-reference Problem 6.1 Introduction
6.2 The computer scientist
6.3 Names and conventions
6.4 Names and cognitive significance
6.5 Reflexivity and names
6.6 Paderewski
6.7 Mach and the shabby pedagogue
6.8 What is said? –I 7. What is Referentialism? 7.1 Introduction
7.2 Dialectical reversal?
7.3 Frege's argument
7.4 On being a (psychologized) Fregean
7.5 Kaplan and direct reference
7.6 Kaplan's arguments for direct reference
7.7 Conclusion Part II. Networks and the No-reference Problem 8. Empty Names, Blocks and Networks 8.1 Introduction
8.2 Conventions and Networks
8.3 Networks: A Simple theory
8.4 No-reference reconsidered
8.5 Network Content and What is Said 9. File Networks
9.1 Notions, Files and Networks
9.2 Intersubjective file networks
9.3 Etiological Structure: origins and parents
9.4 The flow of ideas: intersubjective networks of files
9.5 Networks and information games
9.6 Playing with names 10. Contents and Attitudes 10.1 Introduction
10.2 The original theory
10.3 Two-faced attitudes
10.4 Saying
10.5 Belief Revisited
10.6 Types of notions and threads
10.7 Mach and quasi-indication
10.8 Pierre and disquotation
10.9 Back to Austin
10.10 Conclusion 11. Externalism 11.1 Introduction
11.2 The Two Faces of Motivation
11.3 Meshing Explanations
11.4 Conclusion
11.5 Narrow Enough Content
In this volume John Perry develops his “reflexive-referential” account of indexicals, demonstratives, and proper names. For this new second edition, Perry has added a new preface and two chapters on the distinction between semantics and pragmatics and on attitude reports. He reveals a coherent and structured family of contents—from reflexive contents that place conditions on their actual utterance to fully incremental contents that place conditions only on the objects of reference—reconciling the legitimate insights of both the referentialist and descriptivist traditions.
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
John Perry is the Henry Waldgrave Stuart Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Stanford University.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface to the Second Edition
Preface to the First Edition
1. Two Problems About Reference 1.1 Mach and the shabby pedagogue
1.2 Paradigms, arguments and problems
1.3 Has semantics rested on a mistake?
1.4 The reflexive-referential theory
1.5 Network content
1.6 Plan
Part I. Reflexivity and the Co-reference Problem
2. Contents and Propositions 2.1 Introduction
2.2 Meaning and content
2.3 Common sense and official content
2.4 The classificatory concept of content
2.5 Conditions and propositions
2.6 Varieties of designation 3. Utterance and Context 3.1 Introduction
3.2 The reflexive-referential theory
3.3 Signs, tokens and utterances
3.4 Context
3.5 Semantic uses of context
3.6 Content-supplemental uses of context 4. Context and Cognitive Paths 4.1 Introduction
4.2 Information games
4.3 Cognitive paths
4.4 Indexicals and contexts
4.5 Stretch the dog
4.6 Dthat
4.7 Real, doxastic and fictional contexts 5. Meanings and Contents 5.1 Introduction
5.2 Reichenbach, reflexivity and indexical content
5.3 Indexical content and referential content
5.4 Varieties of content
5.5 Official content
5.6 Stretching cognitive content
5.7 Austin's two tubes 6. Names and the Co-reference Problem 6.1 Introduction
6.2 The computer scientist
6.3 Names and conventions
6.4 Names and cognitive significance
6.5 Reflexivity and names
6.6 Paderewski
6.7 Mach and the shabby pedagogue
6.8 What is said? –I 7. What is Referentialism? 7.1 Introduction
7.2 Dialectical reversal?
7.3 Frege's argument
7.4 On being a (psychologized) Fregean
7.5 Kaplan and direct reference
7.6 Kaplan's arguments for direct reference
7.7 Conclusion Part II. Networks and the No-reference Problem 8. Empty Names, Blocks and Networks 8.1 Introduction
8.2 Conventions and Networks
8.3 Networks: A Simple theory
8.4 No-reference reconsidered
8.5 Network Content and What is Said 9. File Networks
9.1 Notions, Files and Networks
9.2 Intersubjective file networks
9.3 Etiological Structure: origins and parents
9.4 The flow of ideas: intersubjective networks of files
9.5 Networks and information games
9.6 Playing with names 10. Contents and Attitudes 10.1 Introduction
10.2 The original theory
10.3 Two-faced attitudes
10.4 Saying
10.5 Belief Revisited
10.6 Types of notions and threads
10.7 Mach and quasi-indication
10.8 Pierre and disquotation
10.9 Back to Austin
10.10 Conclusion 11. Externalism 11.1 Introduction
11.2 The Two Faces of Motivation
11.3 Meshing Explanations
11.4 Conclusion
11.5 Narrow Enough Content