Introduction vii 
 I What's in a Name? 1 
 1 Lexical Syntax vs Lexical Semantics 1 
 2 An Anaphoric Treatment of Frege's Puzzle 3 
 3 Names Contrasted With Deictics 6 
 4 On the Type-Individuation of Names 8 
 5 An Anaphoric Treatment of Kripke's Puzzle 12 
 6 Empty Names and the Anaphoric Thesis 14 
 7 Names and Principle C 17 
 8 On the Pragmatics of Substitution 21 
 9 Conclusions 31 
 II The Psychology of Direct Reference 33 
 1 Preliminaries 33 
 2 Concepts vs Conceptions: A Referentialist Approach 34 
 3 What that Clauses Do Not Specify 48 
 III Recanati's Accommodationist Neo-Russellianism 57 
 IV Meaning, Reference and Cognitive Significance\csli@forText $^*$ 85 
 1 Frege on Sense, Reference and Cognitive Significance 85 
 1.1 A Fregean Conception of Semantic Competence 89 
 2 Against FAC 96 
 2.1 PHCS and Coarse-Grain Propositions 97 
 2.2 PHCS and Fine-Grain Propositions 103 
 3 Rejoinders 107 
 3.1 Metalinguistic Rejoinders 108 
 3.2 A Neo-Fregean Rejoinder 112 
 3.3 Interpreted Logical Forms 117 
 4 Against CCRD 129 
 4.1 Publicity meets the Idiosyncracy of Epistemic Access 130 
 5 Concluding Remarks and a Look Ahead 137 
 V How to Select a Mode of Reference 141 
 1 Preliminaries 141 
 2 An Intuition Pump 143 
 3 Indexically Locating Reference 149 
 4 A Semantic Interlude: Anchoring Directives and Anchoring Routines 156 
 5 Conclusion 165 
 VI Emptiness without Compromise\csli@forContents : A Referentialist 
Semantics for Empty Names \csli@forText : A Referentialist Semantics for 
Empty Names 169 
 VII Singular Beliefs and their Ascriptions 193 
 1 Preliminaries 193 
 2 Belief Content as the Joint Product of Mind and World 194 
 3 On the Incredibility of Merely Notional Contents 209 
 4 On the Notional Primacy of Fulsomely De Re Ascriptions 214 
 5 Conclusion 229 
 VIII We've Got You Coming and Going\csli@forText $^*$ 233 
 IX Sex, Breakfast, and Descriptus Interruptus\csli@forText $^*$ 255 
 1 Preliminaries 255 
 2 Sex and Breakfast 256 
 3 Descriptus Interruptus 266 
 4 A Gricean Conclusion 270 
 X Same Believers 273 
 XI Narrow Content Functionalism and the Mind-Body Problem$^*$ 287 
 1 Preliminaries 287 
 2 The Initial Argument 289 
 3 De Dicto Semantic Types 293 
 4 Fraternal Twin Earth 298 
 XII Supervenience and Levels of Meaning\csli@forText $^*$ 307 
 1 Appendix I 319 
 1.1 White's Formal Definitions 319 
 2 Appendix II: Partial Character in the Theory of Meaning 320 
 XIII What in Nature is the Compulsion of Reason? 325 
 1 Prima Facie Conflicts 325 
 2 An Unnatural History of Reason 339 
 3 Norms of Reflection 353 
 XIV Toward a Naturalistic Theory of Rational Intentionality 359 
 1 Preliminaries 359 
 2 Toward the Naturalization of Reason 362 
 2.1 The Consequentialist Intuition 362 
 2.2 Toward the Internalist Intuition 366 
 2.3 The Kantian Intuiton 370 
 2.4 A Kantian Reconciliation 378 
 3 The Great Chain of Intentionality: From Sentience to Sapience 389 
 3.1 Of Pouncers and Frogs 389 
 3.2 Aggregating up: A Sketch 399 
 References 403 
 

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