Contents
Preface
Introduction
1. Proto-Theories of the New Class: Hegel, Saint-Simon, and Marx
2. The Vanguard Project
3. A Bureaucratic Class in Soviet-Type Society
4. Beyond Bureaucratic Power: Humanistic Intellectuals and Technocrats under State Socialism
5. The Fall of the Class Project of the Socialist Reform Intelligentsia
6. Intellectuals under Postcommunism
7. Bourgeois and Post-Marxist Theories of the New Class in the West
8. The Neo-Marxist Response to Bourgeois Theories of the New Class
9. The Limits of the New Class Project in the West
Conclusion: The "Third Way" as the Fourth Wave of New Class Projects?
Notes
Works Cited
Index
Preface
The purpose of this book is to tell the history of the idea of the "New Class" as a history of-so far always unsuccessful, but while pursued not necessarily unviable-"power plays" or even "class projects" by various fractions of intellectuals.
	The term "New Class" was coined by the anarchist Bakunin around 1870. Bakunin accused Marx of advancing a theory that was actually a project by the intelligentsia to exploit the working-class movement. By pretending to represent working-class interests, intellectuals sought to establish themselves as a new dominant class after the fall of capitalism and the propertied bourgeoisie. History did not follow Bakunin's forecast: while intellectuals in the first Marxist-inspired revolution, the Russian Revolution of 1917, did play a formidable role, soon after their victory not only were they squeezed out of power positions by the Stalinist bureaucracies, but many of them perished in the Gulag.
	Future generations of New Class theorists, however, were not discouraged by this historically falsified prediction. Repeatedly during the twentieth century, social theorists came forward with new scenarios in which the propertied bourgeoisie eventually would lose power. These theorists argued that while the working class was an unlikely candidate to replace the bourgeoisie, different fractions of intellectuals, bureaucrats, technocrats, managers, and left-wing humanistic intellectuals would be likely to grab that power. 
	Frederick Taylor was the first New Class theorist in the West. When he formulated the idea of scientific management at the end of the nineteenth century, the concept arguably represented a rather radical project by university-trained engineers to remove owners and financiers from the command positions of corporations and replace them with scientifically trained personnel. During the early twentieth century these radical engineers inspired Thorstein Veblen to consider the possibility of "Soviets of engineers" as the force for postcapitalism in the United States. Similarly, during the 1960s there were enough radical humanistic intellectuals taking an anticapitalist and anti-individualist stance to be considered a political force to reckon with. None of these projects resulted, however, in any fundamental change of power structure of capitalist societies, and none of these actors succeeded in constituting themselves as a class, certainly not as a new dominant class.
	During the late nineteenth century and during the whole of the twentieth century, no new dominant class emerged; the bourgeoisie retained its position of hegemony. Where capitalism became fully established, intellectuals were effectively co-opted by the bourgeoisie, and transformed themselves into professionals. Thus engineers and managers learned how to manage capitalism efficiently, and by the end of the century they learned from Irving Kristol to salute capitalism with, in that author's terms, "two cheers." The radical humanistic intellectuals of the 1960s were quickly marginalized and some even turned into yuppies, discovering a good side of capitalism. The most recent blow to New Class theory occurred in 1989: after the fall of bureaucratic communism, which was at least in part caused by the activity of dissident intellegentsia and technocrats, intellectuals did not establish a postcapitalist social order in which they were dominant; rather, they accepted the vanguard role of making capitalism on the ruins of socialism.
	What is the point in studying an idea that has so far produced only systematically false predictions? We believe there are at least three good reasons to do so. 
First, the fact that the projects pursued by different segments of intellectuals to collectively occupy major positions of authority failed, does not mean that such projects did not exist. What if intellectuals are guilty as charged by New Class theories-only they failed to achieve their aims? 
	Second, intellectuals like to think of themselves as ironic, and they are. They are also prone to lose the wit of their irony, when it comes to self-reflection. Intellectuals who demonstrate a superb sense of irony in writing about other social actors often turn pathetic when analyzing themselves or fellow intellectuals. Too often theories about intellectuals present knowledge producers as altruistic, as a social category standing outside the major cleavages of society, as a set of people who articulate the interests of others, but not their own. If there are or have been self-serving power projects by intellectuals, one has to be rather innovative to spot these plans, since normally they will be hidden within ideological self-portraits. It may be worth overstating our case; enlarging a picture may be a good strategy to find what is meant to be well-hidden. 
	Third, while the main assertion of this book is that no fraction of the intelligentsia-much less the intelligentsia as a whole-succeeded in establishing itself as a new dominant class anywhere, over the past century, the balance of power among social actors has nonetheless shifted and some types of intellectuals are the clear beneficiaries of this change. In Eastern Europe, intellectuals have played a prominent role in bringing communism down. After the fall of state socialism they undoubtedly filled the power vacuum created by the disintegration of the old communist bureaucratic ruling estate, a vacuum that, in the absence of a propertied bourgeoisie, could only be occupied by intellectuals. Now, East European technocrats in alliance with former dissident intellectuals are busy making capitalism from above, enlisting the help of foreign capitalists. It remains to be seen what kind of capitalism will be the end result of their labor and what sort of positions they will be able to secure for themselves. 
	In the advanced West, no fraction of the intelligentsia plays such a prominent role in society. However, with the globalization of economies and politics, some intellectuals, in particular members of the technocracy, and especially supranational governmental technocrats, have been gaining more clout and relative autonomy from the owners of capital. If the New Deal of the 1930s, and similar social democratic policies, were built on a compromise between domestic capital and labor, any similar new social contract may have to stand on three legs rather than just two. If there is to be a New New Deal, it probably has to be made among capital, labor, and the new technostructure.
	In the East as well as in the West, intellectuals eventually may be ready to confront themselves and acknowledge their own interests, to dare speak with their own voices rather than feel obliged to present themselves as speaking on someone else's behalf. We believe the history of the New Class will come to an end when we arrive at this brave new world. To put it bluntly: a tour around the history of the idea of the New Class may serve the purpose of some sort of collective psychotherapy for modern intellectuals. It may confront them with their most secret and suppressed desires of the past, and make them more comfortable operating in the real world.




Library of Congress Subject Headings for this publication: Communism and intellectuals, Power (Social sciences)Socialism