Harvard University Press, 2007 eISBN: 978-0-674-27815-8 | Cloth: 978-0-674-02490-8 Library of Congress Classification KF4651.R36 2007 Dewey Decimal Classification 342.730412
ABOUT THIS BOOK | REVIEWS | TOC
ABOUT THIS BOOK
This book describes the constitutional law of foreign affairs, derived from the historical understanding of the Constitution's text. It examines timeless and recurring foreign affairs controversies--such as the role of the president and Congress, the power to enter armed conflict, and the power to make and break treaties--and shows how the words, structure, and context of the Constitution can resolve pivotal court cases and leading modern disputes. The book provides a counterpoint to much conventional discussion of constitutional foreign affairs law, which tends to assume that the Constitution's text and history cannot give much guidance, and which rests many of its arguments upon modern practice and policy considerations.
Using a close focus on the text and a wide array of historical sources, Michael Ramsey argues that the Constitution's original design gives the president substantial independent powers in foreign affairs. But, contrary to what many presidents and presidential advisors contend, these powers are balanced by the independent powers given to Congress, the Senate, the states, and the courts. The Constitution, Ramsey concludes, does not make any branch of government the ultimate decision maker in foreign affairs, but rather divides authority among multiple independent power centers.
REVIEWS
The Constitution's Text in Foreign Affairs is impressive. Ramsey defies conventional wisdom that the words of the Constitution do not speak to most contemporary foreign relations law problems, showing instead how these words, as originally understood, can provide a nearly complete answer to fundamental modern questions of foreign relations law. This book is a real contribution to the field.
-- Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law School
In this valuable book, Ramsey evaluates the debate concerning presidential and congressional powers in foreign affairs. While many scholars on both sides of this debate argue that the Constitution itself is little help in defining the relationships between the legislative and executive branch in this area, Ramsey argues that the Constitution's text is the crucial guide to explaining how the founders saw the separate and shared powers of the two branches...In a discussion with important ramifications, Ramsey also explores the meaning of the phrase "executive power" in the 18th-century context. Ramsey argues that in foreign policy and in U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the powers of the president and Congress, the text of the Constitution, and therefore the intentions of the framers, has been misinterpreted.
-- W. W. Newmann Choice
Ramsey approaches the foreign affairs text of the Constitution with high expectations. He places the words of the document front and center in his analysis, and argues that past scholars have failed to mine the text and structure of the Constitution for every insight into foreign affairs power...Writing with grace and clarity, Ramsey has produced a benchmark study that will illuminate future research but also will provide an accessible, lucid, and nicely opinionated Introduction to a set of too-long, neglected constitutional issues.
-- Aziz Huq New York Law Journal
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction: A Textual Theory of Foreign Affairs Law
Part I: Sources of National Power
1. Do Foreign Affairs Powers Come from the Constitution? Curtiss- Wright and the Myth of Inherent Powers 00
2. Foreign Affairs and the Articles of Confederation: The Constitution in Context 00
Part II: Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs
3. The Steel Seizure Case and the Executive Power over Foreign Affairs 00
4. Executive Foreign Affairs Power and the Washington Administration 00
5. Steel Seizure Revisited: The Limits of Executive Power 000
6. Executive Power and Its Critics 000
Part III: Shared Powers of the Senate
7. The Executive Senate: Treaties and Appointments 000
8. Goldwater v. Carter: Do Treaties Bind the President? 000
9. The Non-Treaty Power: Executive Agreements and United States v. Belmont 000
Part IV: Congress's Foreign Affairs Powers
10. Legislative Power in Foreign Affairs: Why NAFTA Is (Sort of) Unconstitutional 000
11. The Meanings of Declaring War 000
12. Beyond Declaring War: War Powers of Congress and the President 000
Part V: States and Foreign Affairs
13. Can States Have Foreign Policies? Zschernig v. Miller and the Limits of Framers' Intent 000
14. States versus the President: The Holocaust Insurance Case 000
15. Missouri v. Holland and the Seventeenth Amendment 000
Part VI: Courts and Foreign Affairs
16. Judging Foreign Affairs: Goldwater v. Carter Revisited 000
17. The Paquete Habana: Is International Law Part of Our Law? 000
18. Courts and Presidents in Foreign Affairs 000
Conclusion: Text as Law in Foreign Affairs 000
Notes
Index
Harvard University Press, 2007 eISBN: 978-0-674-27815-8 Cloth: 978-0-674-02490-8
This book describes the constitutional law of foreign affairs, derived from the historical understanding of the Constitution's text. It examines timeless and recurring foreign affairs controversies--such as the role of the president and Congress, the power to enter armed conflict, and the power to make and break treaties--and shows how the words, structure, and context of the Constitution can resolve pivotal court cases and leading modern disputes. The book provides a counterpoint to much conventional discussion of constitutional foreign affairs law, which tends to assume that the Constitution's text and history cannot give much guidance, and which rests many of its arguments upon modern practice and policy considerations.
Using a close focus on the text and a wide array of historical sources, Michael Ramsey argues that the Constitution's original design gives the president substantial independent powers in foreign affairs. But, contrary to what many presidents and presidential advisors contend, these powers are balanced by the independent powers given to Congress, the Senate, the states, and the courts. The Constitution, Ramsey concludes, does not make any branch of government the ultimate decision maker in foreign affairs, but rather divides authority among multiple independent power centers.
REVIEWS
The Constitution's Text in Foreign Affairs is impressive. Ramsey defies conventional wisdom that the words of the Constitution do not speak to most contemporary foreign relations law problems, showing instead how these words, as originally understood, can provide a nearly complete answer to fundamental modern questions of foreign relations law. This book is a real contribution to the field.
-- Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law School
In this valuable book, Ramsey evaluates the debate concerning presidential and congressional powers in foreign affairs. While many scholars on both sides of this debate argue that the Constitution itself is little help in defining the relationships between the legislative and executive branch in this area, Ramsey argues that the Constitution's text is the crucial guide to explaining how the founders saw the separate and shared powers of the two branches...In a discussion with important ramifications, Ramsey also explores the meaning of the phrase "executive power" in the 18th-century context. Ramsey argues that in foreign policy and in U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the powers of the president and Congress, the text of the Constitution, and therefore the intentions of the framers, has been misinterpreted.
-- W. W. Newmann Choice
Ramsey approaches the foreign affairs text of the Constitution with high expectations. He places the words of the document front and center in his analysis, and argues that past scholars have failed to mine the text and structure of the Constitution for every insight into foreign affairs power...Writing with grace and clarity, Ramsey has produced a benchmark study that will illuminate future research but also will provide an accessible, lucid, and nicely opinionated Introduction to a set of too-long, neglected constitutional issues.
-- Aziz Huq New York Law Journal
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction: A Textual Theory of Foreign Affairs Law
Part I: Sources of National Power
1. Do Foreign Affairs Powers Come from the Constitution? Curtiss- Wright and the Myth of Inherent Powers 00
2. Foreign Affairs and the Articles of Confederation: The Constitution in Context 00
Part II: Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs
3. The Steel Seizure Case and the Executive Power over Foreign Affairs 00
4. Executive Foreign Affairs Power and the Washington Administration 00
5. Steel Seizure Revisited: The Limits of Executive Power 000
6. Executive Power and Its Critics 000
Part III: Shared Powers of the Senate
7. The Executive Senate: Treaties and Appointments 000
8. Goldwater v. Carter: Do Treaties Bind the President? 000
9. The Non-Treaty Power: Executive Agreements and United States v. Belmont 000
Part IV: Congress's Foreign Affairs Powers
10. Legislative Power in Foreign Affairs: Why NAFTA Is (Sort of) Unconstitutional 000
11. The Meanings of Declaring War 000
12. Beyond Declaring War: War Powers of Congress and the President 000
Part V: States and Foreign Affairs
13. Can States Have Foreign Policies? Zschernig v. Miller and the Limits of Framers' Intent 000
14. States versus the President: The Holocaust Insurance Case 000
15. Missouri v. Holland and the Seventeenth Amendment 000
Part VI: Courts and Foreign Affairs
16. Judging Foreign Affairs: Goldwater v. Carter Revisited 000
17. The Paquete Habana: Is International Law Part of Our Law? 000
18. Courts and Presidents in Foreign Affairs 000
Conclusion: Text as Law in Foreign Affairs 000
Notes
Index