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Electoral Incentives in Congress
University of Michigan Press, 2018 Paper: 978-0-472-03750-6 | Cloth: 978-0-472-13079-5 | eISBN: 978-0-472-12375-9 Library of Congress Classification JK1021.C368 2018 Dewey Decimal Classification 324.97305
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ABOUT THIS BOOK
David Mayhew’s 1974 thesis on the “electoral connection” and its impact on legislative behavior is the theoretical foundation for research on the modern U.S. Congress. Mayhew contends that once in office, legislators pursue the actions that put them in the best position for reelection. Carson and Sievert examine how electoral incentives shaped legislative behavior throughout the nineteenth century by looking at patterns of turnover in Congress; the renomination of candidates; the roles of parties in recruiting candidates and their broader effects on candidate competition; and, finally by examining legislators’ accountability. The results have wide-ranging implications for the evolution of Congress and the development of legislative institutions over time. See other books on: Congress | Elections | Legislative Branch | Legislators | United States. Congress See other titles from University of Michigan Press |
Nearby on shelf for Political institutions and public administration (United States) / United States / Government. Public administration:
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