The Theory of Public Choice - II
University of Michigan Press, 1984
Cloth: 978-0-472-10040-8 | Paper: 978-0-472-08041-0
Library of Congress Classification HJ192.T47 1984
Dewey Decimal Classification 330
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ABOUT THIS BOOK
That economics can usefully explain politics is no longer a novel idea, it is a well-established fact brought about by the work of many public choice scholars. This book, which is a sequel to a similar volume published in 1972, brings together a fresh collection of recent work in the public choice tradition. The essays demonstrate the power of the public choice approach in the analysis of government. Among the issues considered are income redistribution, fiscal limitations on government, voting rules and processes, the demand for public goods, the political business cycle, international negotiations, interest groups, and legislators.
James M. Buchanan is University Distinguished Professor and direct, Center for Study of Public Choice at George Mason University.
Robert D. Tollison, formerly director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, is now Abney Professor of Economics at Clemson University.
See other books on: Buchanan, James M. | Finance, Public | Microeconomics | Social choice | Tollison, Robert D.
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