Chapter 1. Introductory Observations  1
1.1. Some Basic Assumptions and Terms 2
1.2. The Strange World
of Costless Transactions  12
1.3. The Ideal Type of the Classical
Liberal State  14
1.4. The Ideal Type of Market Socialism  17
1.5. Constructed or Spontaneous Orders?  19
1.6. The Work of the Invisible Hand Can
Be Accelerated 20
1.7. Rational Incompleteness 21
1.8. Enforcement 23
1.9. The Political Process 25
1.10. Agency  27
1.11. Institutional Stability  28
1.12. Once More with Feeling  30
1.13. The New Institutional Economics and
Modem Institutionalism 34
1.14. Some Notes on the History of the Old
Institutional Economics 40
1.15. Suggested Readings for Chapter 1 44
Chapter 2. Transaction Costs 47
2.1. The Concept of Transaction 49
2.2. Transaction Costs: Illustrations and Attempts
at Definition 51
2.3. Guesstimating the Size
of Transaction Costs 58
2.4. Modeling Transaction Costs:
The Activity "Transaction" 64
2.5. Some Notes on the Development of the
Transaction-Cost Literature 72
2.6. Suggested Readings for Chapter 2 76
Chapter 3. Absolute Property Rights: Ownership of
Physical Objects 79
3.1. The Property-Rights Approach: Some
Basic Concepts 81
3.2. Property Rights: Illustrations and Attempts
at Definition 86
3.3. Property in Physical Objects: The Private
Property Issue 96
3.4. Common Pool Resources  110
3.5. The Emergence of Property Rights  116
3.6. The Economic Analysis of Property Rights:
Some Notes on the Literature 127
3.7. Suggested Readings for Chapter 3  132
Chapter 4. Relative Property Rights:
Contractual Obligations 135
4.1. Basic Principles of
Contractual Obligations 137
4.2. Diverse Types of
Contractual Obligations 141
4.3. Some Elements of Contract Theory from the
Economist's Viewpoint 154
4.4. Three Types of Contract Theory  161
4.5. Resume  188
4.6. The Economics of Contract Law and
Contractual Behavior: Some Notes
on the Literature  190
4.7. Suggested Readings for Chapter 4  197
Chapter 5. Contract Theory 199
5.1. Overview of the Types of Contract Theory to
Be Discussed 201
5.2. Managerial Theory of the Firm: The
Expense-Preference Model 203
5.3. The Principal-Agent Model:
Moral Hazard 206
5.4. The Principal-Agent Model:
Adverse Selection 222
5.5. Implicit Contracts 246
5.6. The Incomplete Contract Model 251
5.7. Self-Enforcing Agreements 258
5.8. The Institution-as-an-Equilibrium-of-a-Game
Approach: A Note 265
5.9. Looking Back 267
5.10. Bibliographic Notes on Formal
Contract Theory 271
5.11. Suggested Readings for Chapter 5 288
hapter 6. The New Institutional Economics Applied to
Markets, Firms, and the State: General
Remarks 291
6.1. The Elementary Rules of a Private
Ownership Economy 292
6.2. General Remarks on Organizations: The
Firm, the Market, and the State 296
6.3. A Brief Guide to the Literature on Order,
Organizations, and Social Networks 305
6.4. Suggested Readings for Chapter 6  311
tapter 7. The New Institutional Economics
of the Market 313
7.1. The Market as Organization  314
7.2. On Price Rigidity  316
7.3. Market Organization as a Result
of Market Cooperation 319
7.4. Some Views of Neoinstitutionalists on
Market Organization 323
7.5. Markets: Corclusion and Outlook 350
7.6. A Brief Guide to the Literature
on Market Organization 352
7.7. Suggested Readings for Chapter 7 358
ipter 8. The New Institutional Economics
of the Firm 361
8.1. The Orthodox Neoclassical Firm  361
8.2. The Incentive to Integrate 370
8.3. The Limits of Integration  380
8.4. Ownership and Control 386
8.5. Institutional Models in the Tradition of the
Neoclassical Theory of the Firm 401
3.6. The Traditional Soviet Firm  413
3.7. The Socialist Labor-Managed Firm  421
8.8. Codetermination  436
8.9. A Comparison of Some Formal Models of
the Firm 451
8.10. The New Institutional Economics of the
Firm: Forerunners and First Steps 457
8.11. The New Institutional Economics of the
Firm: Summary and Main Literature
beyond Coase 459
8.12. Suggested Readings for Chapter 8 468
Chapter 9. The New Institutional Economics
of the State 471
9.1. A Simple Neoclassical Theory
of the State 472
9.2. The Role of Political Institutions 476
9.3. Political Markets 482
9.4. International Relations 485
9.5. A Brief Guide to the Literature on the
Economics of the State and
International Relations 493
9.6. Suggested Readings for Chapter 9  498
Chapter 10. Future Development of the New
Institutional Economics 501
10.1. Institutionalism as Extended
Neoclassical Theory 505
10.2. The Initial Approach Reconsidered  507
10.3. The Basis of a New Paradigm  533
10.4. Moder Institutionalism: The Opportunities
for Progress 548

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